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Protests at national party conventions have long been a part 
of the political landscape in the United States. For example, 
on June 8, 1908, Samuel Gompers, President of the 
American Federation of Labor, led a march for labor rights 
outside the Republican National Convention (RNC) in 
Chicago (Staff, 1908). Over the years, conventions have 
seen protests for woman suffrage, civil rights, farm subsi-
dies, peace in Vietnam and Iraq, the right to life and the 
right to choose, tighter financial regulations on banks, and 
many other issues. Activists travel to conventions to express 
their viewpoints because these gatherings symbolize the 
parties as institutions in a way that no other events do 
(Edelman, 1964: 95). Activists are often motivated to mobi-
lize outside conventions because it is a relatively easy way 
to seize media coverage for their causes (Sobieraj, 2011). 
Convention protests have been especially contentious in the 
2000s, which have seen frequent clashes between protest-
ers and police, as well as mass arrests (Hermes, 2015).
Despite the regular appearance of convention protests 
during the presidential election cycle, relatively little is 
known about why individuals participate in this type of 
activism. Are they there to help or hurt a candidate? To pro-
mote an issue? To express themselves? To see friends? Or 
some mixture of all of these? What factors shape these 
motivations? This lacuna is unfortunate because protest 
organizers are among the policy demanders that work to 
shape party coalitions (Bawn et al., 2012). Through these 
protests, parties and movements meet in the streets outside 
the conventions in a tangible way. A sizeable body of 
research has emerged on how leaders in parties and move-
ments influence one another (see, e.g., Clemens, 1997; 
Frymer, 1999; Schlozman, 2015). Yet, how parties and 
movements affect, and are affected by, rank-and-file activ-
ists remains less-explored territory (but see Heaney and 
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Rojas, 2007, 2015; Layman et al., 2010; Skocpol and 
Williamson, 2012).
In examining this topic, Fabio Rojas and I (Heaney and 
Rojas, 2007, 2015) theorize that political parties and social 
movements sometimes come together in a social space that 
we call “the party in the street.” This space provides an 
opportunity for activists to pressure a party to pursue a 
movement’s issues and, reciprocally, to pressure the move-
ment to support a party’s candidates. We argue that partisan 
identification draws activists into politics when it serves the 
party’s interests, but also pushes activists out of politics 
when their involvement no longer serves the party’s goals. 
Thus, we see a trade-off between party and movement 
activism – which is largely to the advantage of parties – at 
least during periods of high partisan polarization. However, 
this empirical analysis is limited by the fact that it focuses 
on issue involvement without considering the actions that 
activists may try to help or hurt candidates directly.
Samara Klar and Yanna Krupnikov (2016) also examine 
how partisan identification affects political participation, 
though they stress the consequences of the decision by an 
increasing number of citizens to identify as independents, 
who avoid making public commitments to one of the major 
parties. They argue that even though independents may 
tend to vote as if they are loyal partisans, their embarrass-
ment with the parties and with contemporary politics may 
motivate them to refrain from disclosing their partisan lean-
ings. In particular, independents tend to avoid the kind of 
interpersonal activism that promotes the flow of partisan 
ideas through social networks, such as talking to friends 
about politics and displaying partisan bumper stickers, yard 
signs, and buttons. This avoidance of partisan engagement 
on the part of independents is an impediment to the parties’ 
efforts to win elections and govern.
In contrast to Heaney and Rojas’s (2007, 2015) claim 
that parties gain from the participation of independents 
when they are allied with partisans, Klar and Krupnikov 
emphasize that parties lose when independent identifiers do 
not participate in politics. Yet, Klar and Krupnikov do not 
examine what happens when independents do participate in 
partisan politics. How is their participation different from 
that of party identifiers? Moreover, their empirical analysis 
focuses on actions that independents may or may not take 
to help candidates, but does not consider the potentially 
powerful actions that independents may take to hurt 
candidates.
In this article, I argue that combining the Heaney–Rojas 
and Klar–Krupnikov perspectives on partisan and inde-
pendent identifications provides significant insights into 
the competing motivations of protesters outside the national 
party conventions. It considers that activists may act to help 
or hurt a candidate, or speak out on an issue, within the 
same analysis. I argue that partisan identification – or its 
absence – affects the mixed conditions under which activ-
ists seek to be a resource to parties or movements.
The article proceeds, first, by discussing the role of par-
tisan identification and independence in individuals’ par-
ticipation in activism. Second, it outlines the research 
design based on a survey of demonstrators outside the 2008 
national party conventions. Third, it presents descriptive 
survey results. Fourth, it reports estimates of probit models 
for protest motivation. It concludes by considering how 
political parties and social movements relate to one another 
at the grassroots level.
Partisans, independents, and activism
Political activism is a widely prevalent form of political 
participation, though it receives substantially less attention 
than does voting behavior. Activism reflects individuals’ 
involvement in politics that takes place informally, such as 
by participating in demonstrations, writing about issues 
online, organizing citizens’ groups, and writing letters to 
elected officials. Using data from a longitudinal study of 
activism from 1965 to 1997, Catherine Corrigall-Brown 
(2012) reports that approximately two-thirds of Americans 
engage in some form of political activism over their life-
times. Schlozman et al. (2012) argue that this activism 
redirects the attention of politicians away from the prefer-
ences of the median voter and toward the causes champi-
oned by activists.
I argue that partisan identification – or the lack thereof 
– is closely linked with the ways that individuals make 
sense of their participation in political activism. People that 
identify closely with a political party may turn to party poli-
tics to understand and explain their involvement in activ-
ism. They are more likely to be attracted to the competitive 
aspects of elections that are integral to party politics 
(Schattschneider, 1960).
People who describe themselves as independents are 
likely to have different types of concerns about politics than 
do partisans. As Klar and Krupnikov (2016) point out, inde-
pendents may be put off by the conflictual aspects of poli-
tics to a degree that self-identified partisans may not be. 
However, they may also reject partisan identities because 
they are cross-pressured on issues with which they strongly 
identify (Magleby and Nelson, 2012). Social identities 
related to these issues, then, may help to motivate protest 
participation (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Convention pro-
tests usually have a strong issue orientation that is likely to 
amplify these motivations. As a result, the independents 
who protest at conventions may not be in the “middle of the 
road” between the Democratic and Republican parties. 
Rather, they may identify as independents because there is 
at least one issue on which they do not think that the parties 
are extreme enough.
Building on these arguments, it is possible to state a 
series of hypotheses related to partisan identification, inde-
pendence, and the motivation of individuals for participat-
ing in activism outside conventions. First, partisans at 
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convention protests are likely to want to help the presiden-
tial candidate of their party, especially if they are attending 
the convention at which that candidate is nominated. Thus:
H1: Partisans are more likely than independents to be 
motivated by the desire to help a candidate if they are 
protesting at their more-proximate party’s convention.
Second, it is possible that activists protest to hurt the 
chances of the candidate from the other party. They are 
more likely to see the opportunity to do so if they are attend-
ing the convention of the opposing party. Thus:
H2: Partisans are more likely than independents to be 
motivated by the desire to hurt a candidate if they are 
protesting at their more-distant party’s convention.
Third, partisans and independents are likely to be differ-
ently motivated by issues. Because their energy is drawn 
into the competitive aspects of partisan politics, partisans 
are less likely to articulate their motivations explicitly in 
issue terms. In contrast, independents are more likely to see 
issues as closer to their political identities. These propensi-
ties underlie the trade-off between party and movement 
activism. Thus:
H3: Partisans are less motivated to protest by issue con-
siderations than are independents.
Underlying these hypotheses is the more general hypothe-
sis that independents are differently motivated than parti-
sans in attending protests. Independents generally eschew 
working to affect the chances of candidates and instead 
concentrate on their issue concerns. Thus:
H4: Partisans and independents are differently moti-
vated to protest in that partisans place a greater empha-
sis on candidates and independents place a greater 
emphasis on issues.
Convention protest surveys
This study is based on surveys conducted of protesters out-
side the 2008 RNC in St Paul, Minnesota and 2008 
Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Denver, 
Colorado. The attitudes of the participants in the protests 
were assessed using a five-page, pencil-and-paper survey.1 
The questions queried individuals’ motivations for partici-
pating in the protest, partisan identification, ideology, emo-
tional engagement in politics, social networks with other 
protesters, where they live, sex/gender, race/ethnicity, age, 
level of education, and annual income, as well as other atti-
tudinal and demographic questions.
Surveys were collected at all protests using the “anchor 
sampling” method developed by Heaney and Rojas (2007, 
2014, 2015) as an adaptation of exit-poll sampling. The sur-
vey team began by distributing itself throughout the major 
regions of the crowd. Surveyors were instructed to look 
into the crowd and select a person to serve as an “anchor” 
for their counting process. This anchor could be anyone 
they preferred, though the anchor would not be surveyed on 
the understanding that s/he might be selected with bias. 
From the anchor, surveyors counted five persons to the 
right, and then issued a survey invitation; again, counted 
five to the right, then issued a survey invitation, continuing 
until three individuals had accepted the survey. Once three 
surveys were completed, the surveyor selected a new 
anchor and repeated the procedures. Non-responses were 
recorded for the purpose of tabulating response rates. 
Research shows that if these surveys are conducted with 
attention to ensuring random selection and account for 
biases in non-response, then they can generate samples that 
are a good representation of the individuals attending the 
protest (Walgrave and Verhulst, 2011).
Who are convention protesters?
The survey yielded 412 respondents from the DNC, with a 
response rate of 65 percent, and 990 respondents from the 
RNC, with a response rate of 77 percent. All of the analysis 
reported here is weighted according to differences in 
response rates and accounts for different variances in the 
two strata of the survey (i.e. the DNC and the RNC).
The partisan breakdown of protest participants is pro-
vided in Figure 1. The distribution has a strong, overall 
skew toward non-Republicans. Republicans and people 
who lean Republican made up about 6 percent of protesters 
at the RNC and 11 percent of protesters at the DNC. Among 
other participants, there was a greater percentage of inde-
pendents at the DNC and a greater percentage of Democrats 
at the RNC. Roughly 36 percent of protesters at the RNC 
were independents, as were 44 percent of respondents at the 
DNC. Democrats and Democratic leaners made up 45 per-
cent of protesters at the DNC and 57 percent at the RNC.
Respondents were asked “Which are the most important 
reasons that you decided to come to this convention?” They 
were shown a list of 12 options (plus “other”) and asked to 
circle up to three of them. This article focuses on three of 
these options: (1) “To help a candidate win this year’s pres-
idential election”; (2) “To help prevent a candidate from 
winning this year’s presidential election”; and (3) “To 
express my view on a particular issue or issues.” 
Respondents who indicated that they were motivated by 
issues were also asked to “Please specify the top issues.”
Selected motivations are reported by convention in 
Figure 2.2 Respondents were more likely to seek to help a 
candidate at the DNC (14%) than at the RNC (10%) and 
more likely to seek to hurt the chances of a candidate at the 
RNC (18%) than at the DNC (7%). However, issues pro-
vided a more powerful source of inspiration for these 
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respondents.3 Approximately 32 percent of DNC protesters 
and 44 percent of RNC protesters were motivated by 
issues.4 War and peace was the issue most commonly men-
tioned, with 27 percent of respondents volunteering this 
motivation. There was a significant fall-off after war/peace, 
with 6 percent concerned about the economy, 5 percent 
mentioning health, 4 percent calling for group rights, 3 per-
cent pointing to problems with the environment, and all 
other issues falling below this threshold.
Models of protest motivation
This article estimates three probit regression models of pro-
test motivation: one for helping a candidate, one for hurting 
the chances of a candidate, and one for issue motivation. 
Complete-case imputation (Little, 1988) was used to 
replace the values of missing data, which is an appropriate 
method given the low percentage of missing data (King 
et al., 2001).
Each equation includes the same independent variables. 
The first focus variable is More-Proximate Party 
Convention. This variable takes the value of 1 if a Strong 
Democrat, Not Very Strong Democrat, or Independent Who 
Leans Democrat is protesting the DNC; or, if a Strong 
Republican, Not Very Strong Republican, or Independent 
Who Leans Republican is protesting the RNC; 0 otherwise. 
The second focus variable is More-Distant Party 
Convention. This variable takes the value of 1 if a Strong 
Figure 1. Partisan identification of protesters by convention.
Figure 2. Selected motivations of protesters by convention.
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Democrat, Not Very Strong Democrat, or Independent Who 
Leans Democrat is protesting the RNC; or, if a Strong 
Republican, Not Very Strong Republican, or Independent 
Who Leans Republican is protesting the DNC; 0 otherwise. 
The implicit excluded category is independent, which com-
bines both middle-independent category and the other-
independent category.
The remaining variables are included for the purpose 
of statistical control. Ideology is measured on a 9-point 
ordinal scale from left to right, with “To the ‘right’ of 
strong conservative” receiving a score of 9 and “To the 
‘left’ of strong liberal” receiving a score of 1. Enthusiasm 
about Politics and Anxiety about Politics are included in 
order to account for positive and negative emotional 
engagement with the political process. They are measured 
on a 5-point ordinal scale, with people reporting enthusi-
asm and anxiety “Almost Always” receiving a 5 and peo-
ple who “Never” experience enthusiasm and anxiety 
receiving a 1. Social Networks at Protest accounts for the 
possibility that people that perceive that they are well con-
nected at the protest may be motivated differently than 
people that perceive that they are poorly connected at the 
protest. Live in State of Convention controls for the pos-
sibility that local people are differently motivated than 
those that travel a considerable difference to protest the 
convention. Sex/Gender takes the value of 1 for women 
and 0 for men. Race/Ethnicity takes the value of 1 for 
whites and 0 for nonwhites. Age is measured in years. 
Education is measured on a 6-point ordinal scale, with 
“Graduate or professional degree” receiving a score of 6 
and “Less than high school diploma” receiving a score of 
1. Income is measured in thousands of dollars for 2007.
Probit results are reported in Table 1. The estimates in 
equation (1) are consistent with H1. They show that when 
partisans are protesting at their more-proximate party con-
vention, they are more likely than independents to do so 
for the purpose of helping a candidate for president. 
Additionally, consistent with H4, the results show that par-
tisans protesting at their more-distant party’s convention 
are also more likely than independents to want to help a 
candidate for president. That is, they may see their protest 
of the opposing party directly in terms of being helpful to 
their home party. On this point, independents are clearly 
different from partisans: they are very unlikely to protest 
with the intention of helping a candidate. Only about 6 per-
cent of independents reported doing so.
The estimates in equation (2) are consistent with H2. 
They show that when partisans are protesting at their more-
distant party’s convention, they are more likely than inde-
pendents to work to hurt the chances of a candidate. 
However, the results are not entirely consistent with H4. 
The estimates reveal that independents are significantly 
more likely than partisans attending their more-proximate 
party’s convention to protest with the intention to hurt the 
chances of a candidate. Thus, rather than being strictly less 
interested in candidate politics than are partisans, inde-
pendents occupy a middle ground. About 10 percent of 
independents were motivated to stop a candidate, which 
was more than the 4 percent of partisans at their more- 
proximate convention and less than the 25 percent of parti-
sans at their most-distant convention.
The estimates in equation (3) support H3. They demon-
strate that partisans at their more-proximate party conven-
tion are less likely than independents to protest because of 
issue concerns. However, again, the results are not entirely 
consistent with H4. There is no statistically significant dif-
ference in the degree to which they are motivated by issues 
between independents and partisans when they are attend-
ing their more-distant party’s convention. About 40 percent 
of independents and 46 percent of partisans at their more-
distant convention came out due to issues. In contrast, only 
28 percent of partisans at their more-proximate convention 
mentioned issues as one of their reasons.
The effects of the control variables exhibited variation 
across the equations. Anxiety about politics had significant, 
positive correlations across all three equations, though 
enthusiasm about politics only significantly contributes to 
helping a candidate. Women were more likely than men to 
be motivated by issue politics and to hurt the chances of a 
candidate, but were no different from men in wanting to 
help a candidate. Older respondents were more likely than 
younger respondents to be motivated by issues, but age was 
not associated with differences in motivations about 
affecting candidates’ chances. Ideology, Social Networks 
at Protest, Live in State of Convention, Race/Ethnicity, 
Education, and Income were not significantly related to the 
dependent variables in any of the equations.
Given that the largest group of issue-focused protesters 
were concerned with issues of war and peace, I considered 
what would happen if this group was removed from the 
analysis. The results of this alternative specification are 
presented in Table 2. The pattern of direction and signifi-
cance (or lack thereof) matches the main analysis for five of 
six coefficients that were the focus of the hypothesis tests. 
From these results, we can conclude that if issues of war 
and peace moved off the agenda (which, for example, was 
largely the case during the 2016 convention protests), the 
effects of partisan and independent identities would likely 
remain very similar.
Conclusion
The results of this study exhibit consistencies and incon-
sistencies with the extant literature. Consistent with Klar 
and Krupnikov (2016), the results show that independents 
are much less likely than partisans to work to help a can-
didate. Likewise, consistent with Heaney and Rojas 
(2015), the results demonstrate a trade-off between issues 
and party activism, as protesting at one’s own party con-
vention is associated with candidate, rather than issue, 
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motivations. However, in contrast to the argument of Klar 
and Krupnikov, the results reveal that independents are 
more prone than some partisans to protest with the inten-
tion of stopping a candidate. One possible explanation, 
suggested by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), is that independents are more likely to join the par-
tisan fray if they see the need to stop a loss (i.e. the elec-
tion of a bad candidate), than to achieve a gain (i.e. the 
election of their preferred candidate). Thus, it may be pre-
sumptuous to count independents completely out of parti-
san politics. In contrast to Heaney and Rojas, the results 
indicate there is not necessarily a trade-off between party 
and issue activism when partisans are protesting their 
most-distant party’s convention, where partisans are often 
fighting for issues right beside independents.
It is a mistake to see independents as having abandoned 
electoral politics; though, under certain conditions, they do 
exhibit less concern than do partisans. Yet it must also be con-
sidered that a growing share of independents in the population 
represents an opportunity for movements. If movements can 
mobilize people based on issue identities – rather than partisan 
identities – then they may better withstand the vicissitudes of 
partisan politics. Advocates truly committed to issues may be 
more likely to push back against parties, even when their 
more-preferred party is in office, thus sowing the seeds for 
increased relevance by movements in American politics.
Table 1. Probit models of protest motivation.
Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Descriptive Imputation
 Help a 
candidate
Hurt the chances 
of a candidate
Express views 
on issue
Statistics Percent of 
cases
 Coefficient
(SE)
Mean
(SD)
More-proximate party convention
 (= 1)
0.726***
(0.134)
−0.473**
(0.182)
−0.365***
(0.113)
0.193
(0.011)
4.99%
More-distant party convention
 (= 1)
0.244*
(0.119)
0.564***
(0.108)
0.016
(0.087)
0.482
(0.012)
4.99%
Ideology
  (right of conservative = 9, left of liberal = 1)
0.009
(0.026)
0.036
(0.026)
−0.035
(0.021)
2.804
(0.066)
16.9%
Enthusiasm about politics
 (almost always = 5, never = 1)
0.151***
(0.043)
0.016
(0.043)
0.052
(0.034)
3.235
(0.037)
8.49%
Anxiety about politics
 (almost always = 5, never = 1)
0.104*
(0.044)
0.187***
(0.046)
0.082*
(0.035)
3.692
(0.036)
8.20%
Social networks at protest
 (strong = 3, weak = 1)
0.004
(0.061)
−0.039
(0.059)
0.087
(0.047)
1.895
(0.026)
4.78%
Live in state of convention
 (= 1)
0.013
(0.119)
0.206
(0.118)
−0.119
(0.090)
0.779
(0.014)
13.34%
Sex/Gender
 (female = 1)
0.092
(0.097)
0.190*
(0.093)
0.301***
(0.075)
0.495
(0.017)
7.92%
Race/Ethnicity
 (white = 1)
−0.112
(0.135)
−0.010
(0.142)
−0.106
(0.104)
0.884
(0.011)
6.49%
Age
 (in years)
−0.001
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.003)
38.159
(0.525)
8.56%
Education
  (graduate degree = 6, less than high 
school = 1)
0.025
(0.037)
0.000
(0.037)
0.050
(0.030)
3.992
(0.045)
8.63%
Income
 (thousands of dollars)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
50.118
(1.821)
11.98%
Constant −2.370***
(0.334)
−2.158***
(0.327)
−1.330***
(0.245)
 
N 1377 1377 1377  
Mean of the dependent variable 0.145 0.074 0.316  
Strata 2 2 2  
F(12, 1364) 5.130*** 7.650*** 8.170***  
SD: standard deviation; SE: standard error.
*p ⩽ 0.05.
**p ⩽ 0.01.
***p ⩽ 0.001.
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Looking to the future, both the Democratic and 
Republican parties in the United States are facing increased 
contention from social movements – such as the Tea Party, 
Occupy Wall Street, and Black Lives Matter – some of 
which is likely to manifest itself through convention pro-
tests. Politically oriented scholars would be well-advised to 
be attentive to these dynamics in order to understand how 
organized (and disorganized!) groups may be disruptive to 
party coalitions.
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Table 2. Probit models of protest motivation – no antiwar protesters.
Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Descriptive Imputation
 Help a 
candidate
Hurt the chances 
of a candidate
Express views 
on issue
Statistics Percent of 
cases
 Coefficient
(SE)
Mean
(SD)
More-proximate party convention
 (= 1)
0.803***
(0.152)
−0.421*
(0.209)
−0.327*
(0.154)
0.213
(0.012)
5.50%
More-distant party convention
 (= 1)
0.209
(0.141)
0.663***
(0.128)
−0.122
(0.119)
0.380
(0.014)
5.50%
Ideology
 (right of conservative = 9, left of liberal = 1)
−0.005
(0.030)
0.029
(0.029)
0.073**
(0.026)
3.070
(0.063)
18.57%
Enthusiasm about politics
 (almost always = 5, never = 1)
0.145**
(0.047)
−0.015
(0.049)
0.027
(0.045)
3.080
(0.037)
8.74%
Anxiety about politics
 (almost always = 5, never = 1)
0.073
(0.050)
0.181***
(0.052)
0.108*
(0.047)
3.589
(0.035)
8.94%
Social networks at protest
 (strong = 3, weak = 1)
0.023
(0.070)
0.024
(0.070)
0.169**
(0.065)
1.915
(0.025)
5.40%
Live in state of convention
 (= 1)
−0.025
(0.135)
0.122
(0.135)
−0.475***
(0.112)
0.721
(0.013)
14.73%
Sex/Gender
 (female = 1)
0.144
(0.113)
0.183
(0.112)
0.320**
(0.104)
0.435
(0.015)
8.64%
Race/Ethnicity
 (white = 1)
−0.097
(0.153)
−0.067
(0.161)
−0.243
(0.132)
0.845
(0.011)
7.17%
Age
 (in years)
0.001
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.004)
0.008*
(0.003)
35.661
(0.469)
9.43%
Education
 (graduate degree = 6, less than high school = 1)
0.028
(0.043)
0.012
(0.045)
0.032
(0.039)
3.820
(0.042)
9.43%
Income
 (thousands of dollars)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.003*
(0.001)
46.455
(1.730)
12.87%
Constant −2.316***
(0.369)
−2.181***
(0.378)
−1.786***
(0.310)
 
N 998 998 998  
Mean of the dependent variable 0.119 0.137 0.173  
Strata 2 2 2  
F(12, 985) 4.42*** 5.94*** 4.79***  
SD: standard deviation; SE: standard error.
*p ⩽ 0.05.
**p ⩽ 0.01.
***p ⩽ 0.001.
8 Research and Politics 
Supplementary material
The replication files are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.
edu/dataverse/researchandpolitics. 
The supplementary files are available at: http://rap.sagepub.
com/content/3/4
Notes
1. The survey questions in this analysis are listed in Supplement 
1. This protocol received institutional review board (IRB) 
approval and all participants gave informed consent.
2. A summary of responses to all motivations is provided in 
Supplement 2.
3. Respondents were counted as having issue motivations if 
they wrote a policy issue in the space provided. If they wrote 
something other than a policy issue (e.g. “to meet people”), 
then they were counted as a zero on this variable.
4. Of those who said that they sought to hurt a candidate, 29.6 
percent sought to help a candidate and 48 percent sought to 
promote an issue. Of those who sought to help a candidate, 
37.6 percent sought to hurt a candidate and 35.4 percent 
sought to promote an issue. Of those who sought to promote 
an issue, 10.3 percent sought to help a candidate and 17.8 
percent sought to hurt a candidate.
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